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Is Ml Ruined?-Part I
Recent changes in the laws and regulations
governing depository institutions in the
United States have highlighted the impor-
tanteffects ofregu latory policy on the
Federal Reserve's conductofmonetary
policy. In particular, theauthorizationofthe
Money Market DepositAccount (MMDA)
and the Super-NOW Account mark the first
timesincethe Great Depression thatdeposi-
tory institutions could pay unregulated rates
ofreturn on checkable deposits, Some
observers have argued that this deposit-rate
deregulation is a watershed for monetary
policy, since, in their view, itwill cause
permanentproblemsfortheFederal Reserve
in orienting its monetary policy around the
monetary aggregates.
A previous Weekly Letter (January 21, 1983)
focused on potential short-run problems for
the targeting ofmonetary aggregates during
the transition period in which the new de-
regulated deposits are introduced. Offar
greater concern, however, are potential
developments that may permanently impair
the usefulness of monetary aggregates as
guides for monetary policy,
In recent years, the Fed has most often
relied on the monetaryaggregate called M1,
which includes currency in the hands ofthe
public, traditional (non-interest-earning)
checking accounts, NOW accounts and
other miscellaneous checkabledeposits.
M 1 is intended to measure balances held by
the public for makingtransactions. Some"
observers argue that because ofthe newly
unregulated yields on the deposits in M 1,
that aggregate will no longer be a leading
indicatorofthe pace ofeconomicactivity
and inflation; it will merely be acontempo-
raneous reflection ofeconomic conditions.
Moreover, they argue that deposit rate de-
regu lation will make itdifficultand undesir-
able fot the Federal Reserve to control M1
in the short-run of, say, a calendar quarter.
Such control could"induce disruptive vola-
tility in interest rates. The following discus-
sion argues that these problems are by no
means a certainty. In fact, it is possible that
deposit rate deregulation will improve the
usefulness ofMl as a policyguide.
M1 targeting
A fundamental problem in conducting
monetary policy is that the effects ofFederal
Reserve actions (forexample, its open-
market operations) are not immediately
evident. One reason for the delay is that the
interest rate consequences ofFed actions
affect business investment and other spend-
ing with a lag, As a result, the appropriate-
ness ofFed policy also cannot be judged
immediately. To circumvent this problem,
the Fed sets targets for the monetary aggre-
gates because movements in the aggregates
have historically borne aclose relationship
with economic activityand prices in the
future. Ifthe Fed feels confident in the con-
tinuation ofthese relationships, it can
measure the effects ofits current actions on
its economic goals forthe future by examin-
ingthe current behaviorofthe aggregates.
The relationship between the Fed's goals
and money exists, in large part, because the
quantityof moneythe public chooses to
hold in its portfoIiooffinancial assets is in-
fluenced byGNP, pricesand interestrates. It
is this relationship, called the demand for
money, that makes the monetary aggregates
potentially useful intermediate targets of
monetary policy. For example, suppose
concern over inflation makes the Fed want
to lowerthe total spending on goods and
services in the economy. If itfollows an
intermediate targeting procedure, it will
lowerthe target for M 1, According to the
conventional viewofmonetary control, the
Fed would attempt to achieve this lower
target by raising interest rates on Treasury
bills and other short-term debt instruments,
making them more attractive to the publie
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able deposits in Ml. The public would then
decide to hold smaller quantitiesofM 1-
balances and cause M1 to decline.
By rais-ing the cost ofcredit, the increase in
interest rates would also eventually reduce
thepublic'5spendingongoodsand services.
Since the lags from interest rates to M 1 are
shorter than those from interest rates to the
economy, the decline in Ml occurs before
the decline ineconomicactivity. This timing
pattern means that M1 is a leading indicator




great importance on deposit-rate ceilings.
These ceilings ensure thatMl is aless attrac-
tiveasset tothepublicathighmoney-market
rates than at low rates. Thus, tight monetary
policies, which eventually reduce eco-
nomic activity, show upfirst in reductions
in Ml. Without deposit-rate ceilings, this
result is far less certain. Ifbanks could raise
rates on M1deposits exactly in tandem with
money market rates, higher rates would
have little effect on the relative attractive-
ness of securities versus money, and there
would be littleeffecton the quantity ofMl.
Withoutthe abilityto influence the spread
between yields on securities and money, the
Fed would notbe abletocontrol M1 through
that mechanism. Higherinterestrates would
still lowereconomic activity with a lag, and
this in turn would reduceMl, butMl would
merely be a contemporaneous indicatorof
the economy. Since movements in Ml
would no longer foreshadow movements in
GNP, M1would no longerbe as usefuI as an
intermediate target.
The preceding example is obviously an
extremecase. Few analysts would arguethat
the Fed would have absolutely no control of
M 1 through interest rates. Instead, they
would argue that the responsiveness of M1
to changes in the overall level ofmoney
market rates would decline significantly.
This view of monetary targeting, therefore,
2
raises an empiricalquestion: howmuch will
the interest-responsiveness ofM 1decline in
practice? A cut in half, for example, would
not seem to present a significant problem.
The Fed could achieve a given reduction in
aggregate demand simply by loweringMl
by halfas much as would have been re-
quired priorto deposit-rate deregulation.
However, ifthe interest-responsiveness
weretocomevery closetozero, the conven-
tional view of monetarY control implies that
the valueofM 1 as an intermediate target
could become very low.
Buffer stocks
There is an alternate viewofhowmonetary
control works that implies that a lower
interest-responsivenessofM1would make it
a more effective intermediate target. This
view,which has received growingempirical
support in recent years, holds that in addi-
tion to the interest rate channels noted
above, monetary control operates directly
through the supply ofMl provided by the
actionsofthe Fed and the deposit-creating
bankingsystem.
The rationaleforthis view is thatmoneyacts
as a "shock absorber" or buffer stock
between receipts and spending. Short-run
variations in the observed stock ofmoney,
therefore, would not necessarily reflect
changes in people's underlyingdesires to
hold money balances. They could reflect
independent changes in the quantity of
money supplied that are unrelated to under-
lying demand factors such as interest rates.
An inventoryofgoods in awarehouse pro-
vides auseful analogy. Such an inventoryby
its very nature represents the residual ofa
whole set ofother decisions which, in the
short-run, could keep the inventory away
from its "underlying," ordesired, level.
In thisview, moneydemand is partly passive
in the short-run, accommodating itselfto
changes in the supplyofmoney. This view is
entirely consistent with the widely accepted
inventorytheoryofthe transactionsdemand
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transaction costs in determininghow
closely moneybalances are managed.
Sudden inflowsoroutflowsoffunds cause
inventories ofmoney to be pushed away
from their underlyingdesired levels in the
short-run because it is costly for money
holders to make the frequent adjustments
needed to bring moneybalances quickly
back to desired levels.
The emergence ofsophisticated money
managementtechniques and new instru-
ments like repurchase agreements has
lowered transaction costs for some money
holders so that they can nowafford to keep
their holdings ofM1 more closely in line
with their underlying demands. However,
while large corporations and certain house-
holds use these techniques to keep transac-
tions balances at underlying desired levels
on adailybasis, smallerorless sophisticated
corporations and households are likelyto
hold more or less than theirdesired level of
money for an extended period oftime.
Most households and small corporations
have relatively low moneybalances on
average, and actions to adjust those
balances to desired levels may be costly
relative to any resu llingbenefit. Ifmoney
finds it way into these "Ioosely" managed
portfolios it may stay there for awhile.
Moreover, actions ofone economicunitto
bring its holdings into line may throw other
unitsoutofbalance. Forexample, when one
economic unitspends M1 balances to
reduce them to desired levels, itmay simply
be transferring those balances to another
unitwhich ends up holdingthe "excess"
balances for awhile. Thus, the system as a -
whole takes longer to adjustthan does any
one household or corporation.
What is the relationship ofthe buffer-stock
role ofM1 tomonetarytargeting?The buffer-
stock role means that when the Fed in-
creases the supply ofM1 available in the
economy, the public will be willing to hold
the newquantityofM1 in the shortcrun
without large interest rate changes. Over
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longerperiodsoftime, thepublicwill adjust
its M1 balances to its underlyingdemand by
buying or selling securities and goods and
services. These actions will gradually raise
GNPand prices and lower interest rates.
M1 can, therefore, be controlled in the
short-run even if it is notvery responsive to
the overall level of interest rates. Moreover,
because ofMl's buffer-stock role, changes
in Ml will tend to occur in advanceof .
change in GNPand prices. Thus, M1 will
continue to be a useful leading indicatorof
future movements in those variables, even if
deposit rate deregulation makes M1 unre-
sponsive to the level ofinterest rates.
Stablevelocity
Moreover,the relationshipbetween M1 and
GNP (over longer periods oftime) actually
might be improved by a reduction in the
interest-responsiveness ofM1. In other
words, thevelocityofM1-theratioofGNP
to M1 -might become less volatile. With
deposit rate ceilings, velocity can be highly
variable when there are changes in rates
of interest.
An exampleofthe latter problem was
discussed in last week's Letter. In 1983
an unexpectedly large decline in inflation
translated into a largedecline in market in-
terest rates. With deposit-rate ceilings, the
decline in market rates made M1 growth
increase relative to growth in GNP. Thus,
velocity declined (see chart) and made the
rise in M 1 a misleading signal olluture
economic developments.
This problem would not have developed to
the same extent with deregulated deposit
rates. The decline in market rates would
have induced a decline in yields on M 1,
which would have prevented much ofthe
increase in M1 growth. Velocity would not
have declined as much as itdid, and Ml
could have stayed closer to its target range
in 1982.
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Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments· 164.014 - 216 4.360 2.7
loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 142,488 - 207 4.119 3.0
Commercial and industrial 45.049 - 262 3,020 7.2
Real estate 57.359 - 2 564 1.0
loans to individuals 23,406 - 120 214 0.9
Securities loans 2.901 260 606 26.4
U.S. Treasury securities· 8.029 93 1.847 29.9
Other securities* 13,496 - 101 - 1.607 - 10.6
Demand deposits - total# 39,420 -2.264 374 1.0
Demand deposits -adjusted 28,172 - 162 671 2.4
Savings deposits - total 64,627 758 33,838 109.9
Timedeposits - total# 69,427 - 751 - 22,896 - 24.8
Individuals, part. & corp. 61,498 - 662 - 20.965 - 25.4
(large negotiable CD's) 22,426 - 549 - 13,193 - 37.0
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings
















* Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
Editorial comments maybe addressed to the editor(Gregory Tong)orto the author ....Free copiesof
this and other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public Infor-
mation Section, Federal Reserve Bankof San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone
(415) 974-2246.